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Article

Government Governance and the Need to
Reconcile Government Regulation with
Board Fiduciary Duties
Lisa M. Fairfax†
“As our nation works its way through this crisis, and we
look for explanations as to how we reached this point and how
to avoid another crisis in the future, let us keep in mind that a
significant set of checks and balances—ultimately ending with
the boards of directors—has failed.”
—John Schnatter1
“It is a board’s responsibility to oversee management and to
ensure a company’s long-term survival. . . . With the tumbling
and collapse of dozens of major financial and other institutions,
can we draw any conclusion other than that those directors utterly failed in this regard?”
—Carl Icahn2
In light of corporate directors’ clear responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, corporate governance
scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which directors may have failed in that responsibility.3 Corporate statutes require that corporations be managed by or under the di† Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Special thanks to Brett McDonnell as well as the organizers and participants in the Minnesota Law Review conference on Government
Ethics and Bailouts who provided invaluable feedback and commentary on
earlier versions of this draft. All errors, of course, are mine. Copyright © 2011
by Lisa M. Fairfax.
1. John Schnatter, Where Were the Boards?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2008,
at A11.
2. Carl C. Icahn, Corporate Boards that Do Their Job, WASH. POST, Feb.
16, 2009, at A15.
3. See id.; Schnatter, supra note 1, at A11.
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rection of the board of directors.4 Boards, therefore, have an obligation to monitor corporate affairs, ensuring that corporate
managers act in the best interests of the corporation, and that
such managers do not misbehave or otherwise shirk their duties.5 When managers engage in fraud or other corporate misdeeds, that engagement raises questions regarding whether
and to what extent directors failed to effectively exercise their
monitoring obligation.6
Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors’
roles, not only seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight, but also aiming to ensure that boards are held accountable for their oversight failures.7 The newest wave of reforms is no exception. The current
financial crisis not only ushered in an era of significant government entanglement in the financial system, it also generated significant government involvement in corporate governance
matters.8 That involvement ranged from the government becoming a shareholder of major corporations to the passage of a

4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 2010); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2009).
5. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70
(Del. 2006) (discussing oversight duty and liability); In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that directors’
fiduciary duty encompasses a duty to monitor); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.30(b) (2009) (noting that directors must devote attention to their oversight
function).
6. See Icahn, supra note 2, at A15; Schnatter, supra note 1, at A11 (“Behind the CEO of every . . . Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers who led their
company down a path toward financial ruin, there was a board of directors
that sat by silently and let it happen.”).
7. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance? Officer Certification and
the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002); Eric M. Fogel & Andrew Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of
Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 34 (2007); Brian Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 236–37 (2003); G20 Statement on Strengthening Financial System, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2009/09/05/g20-finance-financial-text-idUSL566412820090905 (noting a
need for governance reforms that create better oversight and more appropriate
levels of accountability).
8. See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 156–60 (2010); Lawrence Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary
Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39,
56–74 (2009); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis, 2009 BYU
L. REV. 1571, 1590–603.
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host of regulatory initiatives.9 Such involvement has clear implications for the board of directors, increasing their responsibilities in order to enhance the effectiveness of their oversight
and thus meaningfully enhance board accountability and overall corporate performance.
However, this new wave of reforms appears to impose increased responsibilities on boards without reconciling those responsibilities with board functions and fiduciary law, at least
as that law has been articulated by Delaware.10 The lack of reconciliation not only represents a missed opportunity to reconsider boards’ proper role and function within the modern public
corporation, but also may undermine the effectiveness of reforms.
Part I of this Article pinpoints some of the key reforms that
have implications for board fiduciary duties.11 Part II and Part
III then demonstrate what appears to be a fundamental disconnection between board reforms, on the one hand, and existing board structures and fiduciary law presumably necessary to
support those reforms, on the other. Part II discusses this disconnection as it relates to existing board structures. First, Part
II illustrates the manner in which the reforms may overburden
boards in ways that not only may set them up for failure, but
also may increase the likelihood that boards will engage in the
sort of rubber stamping of managerial and agent decisions that
reforms were aimed at counteracting. In this regard, Part II ar9. See Block, supra note 8, at 156–60; Cunningham & Zaring, supra note
8, at 56–74; Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1590–603; J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.:
How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 294 –99 (2010).
10. See infra Parts II and III. This Article focuses on Delaware in light of
its place of clear dominance in corporate law. See Brett McDonnell, Two
Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2004) (noting the
dominance of Delaware in corporate law); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493 (2005) (“Delaware makes the state corporate
law governing most large American corporations.”); DEL. DIVISION CORP.,
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (indicating that more than
fifty percent of all public companies and sixty-three percent of Fortune 500
companies are chartered in Delaware).
11. As a result of the financial crisis, the government became a shareholder in many public companies, gaining the ability to select directors and
otherwise directly intervene in boards and corporate affairs. See Verret, supra
note 9, at 294 –99. Although this direct intervention has clear implications for
boards and their fiduciary duties, see id. at 304 –07 (discussing potential conflicts of interest raised by government ownership in public companies as well
as ways in which government may be pressuring corporations), this Article
does not analyze those implications. Instead, this Article focuses on the manner in which government regulations impact boards and fiduciary duties.
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gues that the reforms may reflect unrealistic expectations
about boards and their capacity. Second, Part II illustrates how
the reforms may raise serious concerns about whether we can
expect directors to have the expertise to tackle their new responsibilities, undermining the potential effectiveness of those
reforms and once again increasing the likelihood that boards
will unduly rely on managers or outsiders in a manner that
could undermine their effectiveness.
Part III demonstrates the manner in which reforms may be
incompatible with fiduciary duty norms. Those norms, at least
as articulated under Delaware law, currently impose a relatively low risk of any personal liability for directors who may run
afoul of their new responsibilities, particularly with respect to
risk oversight and compensation.12 Part III, therefore, maintains that reforms raise questions about whether we can expect
fiduciary duty law to hinder or support boards’ enhanced obligations. Part IV offers some concluding assessments.
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN GOVERNANCE
REFORM
The financial crisis created the perception that the corporate governance apparatus had generated an environment
whereby directors and officers felt free to engage in risky behavior without fear of repercussions from shareholders or other
corporate constituents.13 Federal reforms seek to alter this environment.14 Specifically, those reforms seek to enhance boards’
monitoring role as well as our ability to hold boards accountable for failing to fulfill that role.15 This Part will discuss three
areas in which the government has intruded on corporate governance matters in ways that have implications for boards and
their fiduciary responsibilities. That discussion will explore executive compensation, risk oversight, and shareholder rights.

12. See infra Parts II and III.
13. See Charles E. Schumer, Press Release, Schumer, Cantwell Announce
Shareholder Bill of Rights to Impose Greater Accountability on Corporate
America (May 19, 2009), in 41ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 1093, 1095 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Ser. No. 1773, 2009).
14. See id.
15. See id.
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A. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
In recent years, public outrage over large executive compensation packages, including bonuses and exit-pay arrangements, has increased.16 That outrage appeared to reach a fever
pitch in the midst of the financial crisis, particularly with respect to companies at which executive pay increased while profits and stock prices plummeted, or when companies paid executives significant salaries and bonuses while receiving
government aid.17 Disgruntled shareholders as well as the general public insisted that there needed to be a tighter connection
between executive pay and corporate performance.18 The public
also expressed concern that executive compensation structures
may have contributed to the financial crisis by incentivizing
corporate managers to take unnecessary risk.19
In the face of this increased public outcry, the federal government has played a particularly aggressive role in regulating
executive compensation.20 That role has implicated a host of issues. This section will focus on four issues: say-on-pay, golden
parachutes, incentive awards and clawbacks, and compensation
committees. This section will conclude with a discussion regarding the impact of these issues on board responsibilities.
1. Say-on-Pay
Much of the efforts to curtail executive pay have coalesced
around the campaign to secure “say-on-pay”—a nonbinding
16. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1,
27–31 (2004); Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation and the Obama Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 492 (2010); Polls Find Strong
Populist Mood in Europe and to a Lesser Extent in the USA, HARRIS
INTERACTIVE, tbl.4 (July 25, 2007), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/
Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-FT-Globalization-2007-07.pdf (revealing that
seventy-seven percent of Americans believe that executives are overpaid). For
the debate over the extent to which executive compensation can be classified
as excessive, see Dorff, supra, at 493 n.7.
17. See Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock—Salary and Options Too: The
Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419–23 (2010).
18. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16.
19. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay,
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance:
Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation (Emory Pub. Law
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10-93, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1546229.
20. See Dorff, supra note 16, at 529–51; David I. Walker, The Challenge of
Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 455–56
(2010).
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vote on executives’ compensation packages.21 Shareholders
have actively encouraged corporations to adopt say-on-pay, and
several corporations have voluntarily done so.22 Then too, although they were never implemented, several federal bills incorporated say-on-pay requirements.23
Say-on-pay advocates argue that shareholders’ advisory
vote will curb excessive compensation, increasing the likelihood
that corporations will more closely align such compensation
with corporate performance.24 In the United Kingdom, where
such votes have been required since 2002, say-on-pay appears
to have created such an alignment, at least with respect to
more closely linking pay to performance at poorly performing
companies.25
Critics of say-on-pay contend that these results will not be
replicated in the United States26 Critics also argue that the
United Kingdom experience reveals troubling pay trends.27
Such trends include an undue reliance on best practices, which
may lead to ineffective compensation policies,28 as well as the
failure of say-on-pay to significantly curtail the overall growth
21. In 2009, say-on-pay was the most prevalent shareholder proposal
submitted. See 2009 Proxy Season Scorecard, RISKMETRICS GROUP (Dec. 15,
2009), http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxy_season_watchlist_2009; see
also Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience
and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 339–40
(2009) (describing shareholder efforts to advance say-on-pay proposals).
22. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J.
119, 122 (2010).
23. As early as 2007, bills in the House and Senate sought mandatory sayon-pay. See, e.g., Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/pdf/
HR1257BillText.pdf; Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S.
1181, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext
.xpd?bill=s110-1181. Similarly, in 2009 there were House and Senate bills incorporating say-on-pay proposals. See, e.g., Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of
2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://law.du.edu/documents/
corporate-governance/legislation/bill-text-shareholders-bill-of-rights-act-of-2009
.pdf; Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, H.R. 2861, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2861.
24. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 336–40.
25. See Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom (Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420394.
26. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 352–53.
27. See infra notes 28–29.
28. See Stephen Davis, Does ‘Say on Pay’ Work? Lessons on Making CEO
Compensation Accountable, in DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 37, 55 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser.
No. B-1622, 2007); Gordon, supra note 21, at 351–52.
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in compensation.29 Empirical evidence from the United Kingdom also indicates that say-on-pay has not increased the connection between pay and performance at well-performing companies.30 In this regard, critics question whether say-on-pay
will have a positive impact on executive compensation, while
insisting that the complexity of compensation decisions are better left to the board.31
Despite these concerns, there has been considerable momentum behind say-on-pay, which has translated into implementation of say-on-pay at the federal level. The first such implementation occurred in connection with the federal
government’s program to provide federal assistance to troubled
companies.32 In October 2008 the federal government enacted
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), which
created a program for financially distressed companies to receive federal funds known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).33 In February 2009 the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA)34 amended and extended the EESA.
In addition to providing federal aid to troubled companies, the
Reinvestment Act requires that companies receiving TARP
funds comply with certain executive compensation and corporate governance standards during the period in which they are
receiving these funds.35 Pursuant to those standards, the ARRA
requires that companies receiving TARP funding provide
shareholders with an annual say-on-pay vote throughout the
period during which such companies receive funds.36

29. See Davis, supra note 28, at 49; Ferri & Maber, supra note 25, at 20;
Gordon, supra note 21, at 344.
30. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 25, at 52; Lund, supra note 22, at
127–28.
31. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 352–53; Lund, supra note 22, at 129–30.
32. See Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Recent Developments in Corporate Control Transactions, in CONTESTS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2010: CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE
STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 39, 190 (PLI Corporate Law & Policy,
Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1786, 2010).
33. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, 122 Stat. 3765.
34. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115.
35. See id. § 7001.
36. See id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg15.aspx.
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In July 2010 President Obama signed into law the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), which among other things included a host of provisions
aimed at regulating executive compensation.37 Dodd-Frank extended the say-on-pay requirement to all public companies.38
Dodd-Frank not only requires public companies to provide their
shareholders with a say-on-pay vote at least once every three
years, but also requires such companies to provide shareholders
with a nonbinding vote on whether the company should hold a
say-on-pay vote every one, two, or three years.39
2. Golden Parachutes
Public concern over executive compensation encompassed
concerns regarding golden parachute payments.40 Golden parachutes refer to compensation paid at an executive’s departure,
particularly when the executive’s departure results from a
change of control at the company.41 One package that especially
fueled public outcry was the $210 million exit payment received
by Home Depot’s chief executive officer (CEO) during a time
when the company had its smallest increase in net income in
nine years.42 Critics pointed to this payment not only as an example of an excessive golden parachute, but also as an example
of the failure to link pay with performance.43 This kind of severance package heightened public anger over the seeming inappropriateness of many golden parachutes.44
Such severance arrangements also prompted reforms
aimed at regulating and even prohibiting such payments.
TARP companies are required to prohibit golden parachute
payments to senior executive officers (defined as the top five
most highly compensated officers) and the next five most highly
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 951, 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900, 1915 (2010).
38. See id. § 951(a)(1).
39. See id. § 951(a)(1)–(2).
40. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi
Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 374 (2009); Josh Fineman, Nardelli Exit Package Called ‘Outrage,’ May Heighten Pay Debate, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 3, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aI7fAyAMAi2A.
41. See Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39
STAN. L. REV. 955, 955–56 (1987); Cherry & Wong, supra note 40, at 374.
42. See Fineman, supra note 40.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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compensated officers.45 Under Dodd-Frank, public companies
must provide shareholders with disclosure on golden parachute
arrangements made in connection with mergers and similar
transactions, and must provide shareholders with a nonbinding
vote on such compensation arrangements.46
3. Incentive Awards and Clawbacks
Public outrage over bonuses and other incentive-based
payments also encouraged the federal government to focus on
incentive-based compensation in a variety of ways.47 When it
was reported that Wall Street bonuses for 2008 would exceed
$20 billion, President Obama referred to such bonuses as
“shameful.”48 Public ire over such bonuses spurred legislative
reforms aimed at curtailing them. Thus, TARP companies must
prohibit the payment of all bonuses, other than long-term restricted stock.49 However, TARP exempts bonuses required to
be paid pursuant to contracts enacted prior to federal legislation.50 Moreover, the number of employees subject to the prohibition depends on the amount of financial assistance the employer received.51
Regulations also require companies to recover bonuses inappropriately paid to executives. Thus, companies receiving
TARP funding must provide for a “clawback” or recovery of bonuses or other incentive-based compensation paid based on
earnings or other criteria later proven to be materially inaccurate.52 The clawback applies to senior executive officers and the
45. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 123, 517–18.
46. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010).
47. See President Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting with
Economic Advisers and an Exchange with Reporters, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres.
Doc. 34, at 1 (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD
-200900034/pdf/DCPD-200900034.pdf.
48. See id.
49. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001.
50. See id.
51. See id. The SEC also implemented disclosure rules that alter the
manner in which corporations must disclose stock and option awards. See
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,338 (Dec. 23, 2009)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239–40, 249, 279).
52. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001. Section 304 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) also has a clawback provision, but it is
more limited because it applies only to the CEO or CFO, and only has a
twelve-month look-back and recovery period. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116
Stat. 745, 778. As of January 2009, the SEC had not recommended any actions
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top twenty most highly compensated executives.53 Dodd-Frank
extended clawback provisions to all public companies, requiring
them to implement policies to recover compensation when it is
later shown that the compensation was based on erroneous financial results.54 Dodd-Frank permits recovery from any current or former executive officer who received incentive-based
compensation during the three-year period preceding the date
of a company’s restated financials.55
4. Compensation Committees
Dodd-Frank requires each public company to establish a
compensation committee responsible for evaluating the company’s compensation practices and policies.56 The committee must
be comprised solely of independent directors.57 To be sure, the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ already require public company compensation committees to be comprised of independent directors.58 In this regard, Dodd-Frank
may be viewed as codifying preexisting listing requirements in
this area. However, the new rules reflect concern that stock exchange independence standards did not go far enough and,
hence, such rules seek to increase the criteria for determining
independence.59 Dodd-Frank also specifically enables compensation committees to hire their own counsel and an independent compensation consultant.60
to require repayment pursuant to section 304, and SOX does not provide for a
private right of action. See Linda E. Rappaport, Hot Issues in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance, in PREPARATION OF ANNUAL
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2009, at 717, 731 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1710, 2010). For an intriguing discussion of how
clawbacks can be used to more closely align compensation with shareholders’
long-term interests, see Cherry & Wong, supra note 40, at 410–22.
53. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001.
54. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010).
55. See id.
56. See id. § 952.
57. See id.
58. See NYSE, INC., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.03 (compensation committee); NASDAQ, INC., NASD MANUAL RULES § 4350(c) (compensation and nominating committees).
59. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: New Independence for
Compensation Committees (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.treasury
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg218.aspx.
60. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 952(c)–(d).
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5. Impact on Board Responsibilities
The combination of reforms focused on executive compensation enhances directors’ duties by requiring them to more
closely monitor and implement corporate compensation practices. Of note, Dodd-Frank states that say-on-pay votes may not
be construed to create or imply any change or addition to the
board’s fiduciary duties.61 Notwithstanding this statement, reforms focused on say-on-pay encourage boards to pay greater
attention to executive compensation matters and shareholders’
preferences with respect to those matters, or risk rejection of
the pay packages approved by the compensation committee.62
Reforms that require disclosure of golden parachute arrangements along with an advisory vote covering such arrangements
appear to have a similar impact.63 Presumably any disclosure
requires boards to gain a better understanding of the arrangements being disclosed. Then too, the fact that the federal government now mandates the existence of compensation committees is likely to enhance their prominence and their
responsibilities. Indeed, corporate governance reforms under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)64 essentially required
public companies to maintain independent audit committees,
which enhanced that committee’s role in the corporate governance landscape.65 It is likely that the focus on compensation
committees will have a similar impact. Moreover, the compensation committee bears responsibility for overseeing the implementation of compensation policies.66 Thus, regulations related to prohibitions on certain forms of compensation
arrangements, or otherwise providing for the creation of compensation policies, require greater involvement by the board
with respect to such matters.
61. Id. § 951(c)(2).
62. See Rebecca A. Crawford, Corporate Governance Reform: How to Promote the Long-Term Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 905, 926 (2009).
63. See, e.g., Jeremy R. Delman, Structuring Say-on-Pay: A Comparative
Look at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation,
2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 583, 590.
64. Pub. L. No. 107-294, 116 Stat. 745.
65. See Bryan A. McGrane, The Audit Committee: Director Liability in the
Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 575, 575 (2009).
66. John D. Shipman, The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the
Wake of SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1194,
1194 n.3 (2007).
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B. RISK OVERSIGHT
Legislators and academics alike have argued that company
policies encouraging or rewarding imprudent risk taking contributed to, if not caused, the financial meltdown.67 Importantly, such policies include compensation structures that may have
enhanced excessive managerial risk taking.68 In light of the
concern related to risk taking, a number of reforms focus on
risk, particularly risk associated with compensation structures.
1. Risk Evaluation and Limits
TARP addresses risk in at least two ways. TARP recipients
are required to impose limits on compensation to exclude incentives for senior executives to take “unnecessary and excessive
risks.”69 TARP also requires recipients to have compensation
committees comprised solely of independent directors with responsibility for evaluating employee compensation plans to assess the risk posed by such plans.70 Most public companies already had compensation committees composed of independent
directors.71 However, TARP requirements mark the first time
the federal government specifically directed such committees to
focus on risk.72 These requirements mark the first time the fed-

67. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 19, at 249; Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 185
(2009); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 159, 159 (2010); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg163.aspx (“At many
firms, compensation design unintentionally encouraged excessive risk-taking,
providing incentives that ultimately put the health of the company in danger.”); Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors,
HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Dec. 17, 2009, 9:33 AM), http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/12/17/risk-management-and-the-board-of
-directors-2/ (“[The] public and political perception [is] that undue risk-taking
was central to the breakdown of the financial and credit markets.”).
68. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 19, at 249; Tung, supra note 19,
at 2 n.2.
69. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, § 111, 122 Stat. 3765, 3777.
70. See id.
71. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
72. See The Economic Crisis: Broader Executive Compensation Reforms
Coming Soon, K&L GATES LLP, http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail
.aspx?publication=5777 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (noting that historically
risk and compensation issues were managed separately by boards).
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eral government demanded that such committees evaluate the
compensation arrangements of all employees.73
2. Risk Disclosure and Oversight
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also implemented enhanced risk-disclosure requirements.74 Corporations now must provide a narrative discourse about the compensation policies of all employees as they relate to risk
management and risk taking incentives if such policies create
risks that are “reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect” on the corporation.75 The SEC’s disclosure rule not only
includes a nonexhaustive list of examples that may trigger disclosure by suggesting that compensation policies may be risky,
but also includes issues that must be addressed to the extent a
company determines that disclosure is warranted.76 In crafting
the rule, the SEC noted that a company may appropriately conclude that “its compensation policies are not reasonably likely
to have a material adverse effect on the company” and, hence,
do not require disclosure.77 Indeed, because the SEC only requires companies to disclose policies that have a material “adverse” effect, companies avoid having to discuss arrangements
that would serve to mitigate inappropriate risk taking.78 For
companies that conclude disclosure is not necessary, the SEC
rule does not require them to affirmatively state that they have
determined the risks arising from their compensation policies
are not reasonably expected to materially impact the corporation.79
In addition to this risk assessment, the SEC requires corporations to describe the board’s role in risk oversight.80 The
73. See CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, COMPENSATION AND
RISK: COMPENSATION COMMITTEE ACTIONS UNDER NEW SEC RULES 1 (2009)
[hereinafter COMPENSATION AND RISK], available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/
News/763d0ecc-7c1c-4174 -aefa-fc354f40f67e/Presentation/NewsAttachment/472
aa234 -4cfe-48dc-bd3f-0067d4f99847/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Compensation%
20and%20Risk.pdf (noting that, prior to the reforms, most compensation
committees did not review the compensation arrangements of all rank-and-file
employees).
74. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23,
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239–40, 249, 274).
75. See id. at 68,334.
76. See id. at 68,337.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 68,338.
80. See id. at 68,345.
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new rule not only seeks to assess how the board administers its
risk oversight function, but also how the board receives information from those responsible for day-to-day risk assessment.81
3. Impact on Board Responsibilities
Collectively, these reforms focus boards’ attention on risk
and risk assessment, broadening their responsibility for monitoring risk, particularly as it relates to compensation matters.
Indeed, most compensation committees currently do not routinely review the compensation arrangements for all employees.82 As a result, requirements to evaluate compensation
arrangements extending beyond the CEO and top executives
represent a significant expansion of the committee’s duties.
Then too, compensation committees did not necessarily review
compensation arrangements with an eye towards evaluating
their impact on risks.83 Hence, reforms ensure that compensation committees have a heightened level of involvement in risk
assessment. Moreover, by mandating disclosure on board involvement in risk oversight, the reforms increase the likelihood
that boards will play a more comprehensive role in risk assessment.
C. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
In the past few years, shareholder activism has increased
as shareholders have sought to enhance their authority over director elections and corporate governance.84 Advocates of increased shareholder power argue that augmenting shareholder
rights not only will positively impact corporate performance,
but also will enhance board and managerial accountability,
thereby reducing incidences of misconduct and shirking.85 Op81. See id.
82. See COMPENSATION AND RISK, supra note 73, at 1.
83. See Lipton et al., supra note 67 (noting that most boards delegate the
risk management function to the audit committee).
84. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 54, 61–78 (2008).
85. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (noting that new proxy access rules were aimed at responding to serious concerns
about the accountability and responsiveness of some companies and their
boards, as well as the need to ensure that they exercise effective oversight);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 835, 836 (2005); Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Increasing Accountability
and Transparency to Investors, Remarks at “The SEC Speaksin 2009” (Feb. 6,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609laa.htm
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ponents raise considerable objections to increased power, ranging from its potential to undermine board discretion necessary
to ensure the efficient management of corporations, to concerns
that shareholders will use their increased power to advance
special interests or issues antithetical to the best interests of
the corporation and the broader shareholder class.86 Despite
these concerns, many federal reforms focus on enhancing
shareholder power; such reforms necessarily implicate boards.
This section will analyze three such reforms—say-on-pay, broker discretionary voting, and proxy access—and their impact on
board responsibilities.
1. Say-on-Pay
As noted in Part I.A, Dodd-Frank entitles shareholders of
public companies to have a say on executive compensation and
golden parachutes in connection with mergers, acquisitions, or
similar transactions.87 Say-on-pay is designed to provide
shareholders with a voice in executive compensation decisions
and to hold directors accountable to shareholders for the compensation decisions they make.88
2. Broker Discretionary Voting
In July 2009 the SEC adopted a rule that eliminated broker discretionary voting for uncontested director elections.89
Under NYSE Rule 452, if the beneficial holders of shares failed
to provide brokers with voting instructions by the tenth day before a shareholder meeting, brokers could vote any such uninstructed shares for “routine matters.”90 The SEC decided to
eliminate uncontested elections from those matters classified as
“routine,” thereby prohibiting brokers from voting uninstructed
(“[S]hareholders can do a lot to align company management’s incentives with
the public interest.”).
86. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746
(2005); William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653 (2010).
87. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010).
88. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 337–40.
89. See Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Changes to Eliminate Broker Discretion Voting for the Election of Directors, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,305
(July 10, 2009).
90. See id. at 33,293 n.7.

2011]

GOVERNMENT GOVERNANCE

1707

shares in such elections.91 This rule change took effect in January 2010.92 Dodd-Frank codified this change and extended it to
all national securities exchanges.93 Dodd-Frank also required
that the SEC eliminate broker discretionary voting on compensation matters and any other matter the SEC determined was
“significant.”94
The broker voting change could have a significant impact
on shareholders’ voting authority. Empirical evidence reveals
that broker discretionary voting almost always followed the advice of managers and incumbent directors, potentially distorting votes in their favor.95 This evidence suggests that eliminating such voting is likely to increase shareholders’ role in
election matters.
3. Proxy Access
Proxy access—the ability of shareholders to access the corporation’s proxy statement for purposes of nominating their
own candidates—is the subject of contentious debate in the
corporate arena.96 Proponents of proxy access insist that such
access will enhance shareholder voice and corporate accountability by ensuring that shareholders have a meaningful voice in
board elections and, by extension, corporate affairs.97 Opponents contend that such access could have a deleterious impact
on the corporation.98 Some argue that such access could enhance the number of proxy contests, thereby creating unnecessary costs and distraction for corporations and their boards.99
Others contend that proxy access will enable shareholders with
91. See id. at 33,298.
92. See id. at 33,293 n.6.
93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1906 (2010).
94. See id.
95. See PROXY WORKING GRP. TO THE N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE 14 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf.
96. Compare Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 836, with Bainbridge, supra note
86, at 1746.
97. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,761 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
(noting the potential of proxy access to lead to “greater accountability on the
part of incumbent directors to the extent they see a close link between their
performance and the prospect of removal”); Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 836.
98. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,765–66 (discussing concerns).
99. See id. at 56,765 (discussing concerns).
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special interests to gain unwarranted influence over the company and its policies.100 Given the strength of views on both
sides of this issue, shareholders have found it difficult to obtain
proxy access.101
The federal government has played a vital role in the proxy
access debate. As an initial matter, in an effort to pave the way
for a proxy access rule, Dodd-Frank specifically authorized the
SEC to create a proxy access rule.102 This authorization reflected a direct response to those who insisted that the SEC lacked
the authority to mandate proxy access.103
Shortly after this authorization, the SEC approved a proxy
access regime for the first time in its history.104 That regime
not only requires every public company to grant proxy access to
its shareholders, but also allows shareholders to propose additional mechanisms for gaining access to the company’s proxy
statement.105 Under the new rules, shareholder nominees may
be included on a corporation’s proxy statement if they (1) own
at least three percent of the voting power of the company’s securities, (2) have held such securities continuously for at least
three years, and (3) are not holding the securities in order to
change control of the company or gain board seats exceeding
the maximum number required to be included under the SEC’s
rule.106 Under the new regime, a company is not required to include more than one nominee, or the number of nominees that
would represent up to twenty-five percent of the company’s
board, whichever is greater.107
In addition to mandating proxy access, the new rules
amend the federal shareholder proposal rule to enable shareholder proposals regarding the company’s nomination proce-

100. See Bainbridge, supra note 86; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 86.
101. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND.
L.J. 1259, 1273–79 (2009).
102. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010).
103. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,674.
104. See Neal Lipschutz, ‘Proxy Access’ Era Begins; Welcome to the Unknown, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052748703632304575451892123490472.html.
105. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,670.
106. See id. at 56,674 –75.
107. See id. at 56,675.
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dures to appear on the company’s proxy statement.108 The SEC
made clear that if shareholders approve any such proposals,
they will not supplant the mandated access rule.109 Instead,
such proposals would represent an additional route through
which shareholders could access the corporation’s proxy statement in order to nominate candidates of their choice.110
The proxy access rules were scheduled to take effect on
November 15, 2010, and apply to public companies (other than
small issuers) that had mailed their proxy statements on or after March 15, 2010.111 However, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable challenged the SEC’s authority to implement such rules.112 As a result, the SEC
announced that it would delay implementation of the rules until a court ruling on the suit, which is not expected until late
spring of 2011 at the earliest.113
Proxy access is aimed at enhancing shareholders’ nomination right and, hence, their ability to influence board elections and, by extension, corporate governance.114 Because of the
dispersed nature of public shareholders, such shareholders typically vote by proxy—that is, they do not attend the shareholder
meeting in person, but rather designate a representative to cast
a vote on their behalf.115 Proxy rules require that any solicitation of shareholders’ proxy be accompanied by a proxy statement filed with the SEC and distributed to shareholders entitled to vote.116 Thus, when shareholders vote on board
108. See id. at 56,676–77. This new provision reverses a provision adopted
by the SEC in 2007. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2010).
109. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,730–31.
110. See id.
111. See Memorandum from Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati to clients of
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Effective Date of Proxy Access Rules Announced (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.wsgr.com/publications/
pdfsearch/wsgralert_proxy_rules_effective_date.pdf.
112. See Jessica Holzer, Lawsuit Aims to Overturn Proxy Rule in Overhaul,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2010, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704116004575522151605541266.html.
113. See Jesse Westbrook, SEC Delays Proxy-Access Rules Amid Legal
Challenge, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2010, 5:34 PM), http://www
.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-04/sec-delays-proxy-access-rules-amid-legal
-challenge.html.
114. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,669–70.
115. See id. at 9.
116. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(2) (2010) (distribution to shareholders);
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2010) (filing with the SEC).
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candidates, corporations distribute a proxy statement identifying the names of director-candidates.117 Currently, only management-supported candidates appear on the corporate proxy
statement.118 As a general matter, shareholders seeking to
nominate candidates of their choice must engage in a proxy
contest pursuant to which they prepare and distribute their
own separate proxy statement.119 Evidence suggests that the
costs and other logistical hurdles associated with waging a
proxy contest makes it prohibitive for all but a small percentage of shareholders.120 As a result, very few shareholders have
the opportunity to nominate candidates of their choice.121 Thus,
in most director elections, shareholders only vote on candidates
supported by management and the incumbent board. Proxy
access appears to change this dynamic, ensuring that boards
are not simply nominating themselves, thereby increasing the
likelihood that boards feel more accountable to shareholders.122
4. Impact on Board Responsibilities
Increasing shareholders rights implicates directors’ responsibilities. Reforms in this area are designed to increase the
likelihood that directors will pay closer attention to, and be better informed about, shareholder concerns.123 Hence, law firms
have begun encouraging corporations to become better informed about their shareholder base in the wake of proxy
access and broker voting changes.124 Moreover, reforms that in117. See id. § 240.14a-3 (2010).
118. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2010).
119. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,755.
120. See id. at 56,755–57.
121. See Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 856 (discussing the relatively small
number of proxy contests waged each year).
122. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,761.
123. See CLEARY GOTTLEIB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, ALERT MEMO:
RESPONDING TO THE ELIMINATION OF BROKER DISCRETIONARY VOTING IN
ELECTIONS OF DIRECTORS 3–5 (2009) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO BROKER
VOTING], available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/0463ffec-4df5-4fe7-ad00
-23897d70b313/Presentation/NewsAttachment/be81ee82-fd96-4837-a7d0-74b4d
2d8a359/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Responding%20to%20Elimination%20of%
20Broker%20Discretionary%20Voting%20in%20Elections%20of%20Directors.pdf
(emphasizing the need for enhanced responsiveness to shareholder concerns).
124. See id. at 3 (noting the need to refocus on shareholder outreach); SEC
Adopts Shareholder Proxy Access Rules, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, (Aug. 30,
2010), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_proxy_access_0830/ (noting that in the face
of increased shareholder power, outreach and attention to shareholder relations “will be more important than ever”); Proxy Access Litigation and Next
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crease shareholder power also increase the likelihood that directors will enhance their engagement with shareholders on a
more routine basis. Anecdotal evidence from the United Kingdom reveals that say-on-pay has increased communications between boards and shareholders with respect to compensation.125 A similar pattern may emerge in the United States
Additionally, anecdotal evidence in the United States suggests
that increased shareholder activism has prompted corporations
to meet more frequently with some of their large shareholders.126 Although directors did not historically view engagement
with shareholders as part of their job, increased shareholder
activism coupled with reforms aimed at giving shareholders
greater voice, have prompted corporations to facilitate directorshareholder communication.127 In this respect, reforms aimed
at enhancing shareholder power may lead to a climate of more
active engagement between shareholders and directors.128
While such a climate may be beneficial, it certainly expands
boards’ responsibilities.129

Steps, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www
.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/ProxyAccessLitigationAndNextSteps.aspx
(recommending that companies reach out to their significant shareholders,
keep directors informed about shareholder concerns, and reach out to their entire shareholder base); SEC Adopts Proxy Access Rules to Facilitate Shareholder
Nominations of Directors, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www
.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2010/SEC-Adopts
-Proxy-Access-Rules-to-Facilitate-Shareholder-Nominations-of-Directors.aspx
(advising corporations to get to know their large shareholders); SEC Eliminates Discretionary Broker Voting for Uncontested Director Elections, WILSON
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (July 15, 2009), http://www.wsgr.com/
wsgr/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert_rule452_
amendment.htm (advising companies to get a better understanding of their
shareholder base and potential changes to that base, and “[t]ake a more comprehensive, year-round” approach to director elections).
125. See Davis, supra note 28, at 50; Gordon, supra note 21, at 342 (noting
the much higher level of shareholder engagement); Lund, supra note 22, at
126–27.
126. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, DANGEROUS TALK? WHEN/HOW SHOULD
DIRECTORS COMMUNICATE WITH SHAREHOLDERS? 2, available at http://www
.directorsforum.org/resources/pdf/cdf_dangerous_talk_program_outline_3-18.pdf?
ID=3.362 (describing companies’ increased engagement with shareholders).
127. See id. at 2–3.
128. See id.
129. See infra Part II.A.
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II. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN BOARD REFORMS AND
BOARD REALITIES
The governmental reforms pinpointed in Part I appear to
lose sight of at least two realities of current board structure
that not only undermine the potential effectiveness of those reforms, but also highlight the need for reconsideration of the
board’s role. This section examines three areas. First, reforms
appear to have an unrealistic expectation about board capacity,
potentially overburdening boards in ways that may undermine
their ability to be effective. Second, reforms not only impose a
myriad of new responsibilities on boards without sufficient consideration of whether board members have sufficient expertise
to effectively tackle those responsibilities, but also impose criteria on directors that may undermine their expertise, increasing the likelihood that boards will feel ill equipped to adequately perform their duties. Reforms also increase the likelihood
that boards will inappropriately rely on third-party advisors
and managers, engaging in the kind of rubber-stamping of their
decisions reforms were aimed at combating. This section addresses each of these issues.
A. PART-TIME JOB, FULL-TIME RESPONSIBILITIES?
Reforms impose increasing amounts of responsibility on
board members. Some reforms even pinpoint the number of
meetings to be held by directors.130 For example, companies receiving TARP funding must ensure that their compensation
committees meet at least semiannually to discuss and evaluate
any risks associated with the company’s employee compensation plans.131 Proxy data reveals that directors spend considerably more time on board matters as compared to ten or twenty
years ago.132 Moreover, the time commitment associated with
board service grew significantly in the wake of governance reforms passed under SOX.133 It seems likely that the current set

130. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 518.
131. Id.
132. See KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY
10 (2007), available at http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdf1/Board_
Study07_LoRez_FINAL.pdf; SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER STUART BOARD
INDEX 8–9 (2009), available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/
lib/SSBI2009.pdf.
133. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 10.
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of reforms will generate a similar increase in the amount of
time directors must devote to board matters.
However, reforms fail to reconcile this increased time
commitment with the limited nature of board service.134 As an
initial matter, reforms appear to lose sight of the fact that
board membership represents a part-time position. Many reforms, such as those involving the compensation committee,
impose duties on directors who are required to be independent.135 However, even when reforms do not embody such a requirement, empirical data demonstrates that the vast majority
of public company directors are independent.136 By definition,
independent directors are people who have no employment relationship with the company, which means that such directors
often have outside engagements, including other full-time
jobs.137 One 2007 study revealed that seventy-eight percent of
companies have at least one active CEO or chief operating officer (COO) on the board.138 A 2009 study further revealed that
although active CEOs, COOs, and presidents no longer dominate the board, they still account for twenty-six percent of all
new directors.139 Moreover, sixty-one percent of new directors
are active executives or professionals.140 These statistics confirm that most directors have significant outside obligations,
requiring them to balance their board responsibilities with
these obligations. Reforms only exacerbate this difficult balancing act.
Second, reforms do not appear to sufficiently appreciate the
fact that boards consist of a relatively small group of people.
The average public company board consists of ten directors, a
number that has been virtually unchanged for at least a decade.141 However, board size has decreased significantly from its
historical levels in which the average board contained between
sixteen and twenty-five directors.142 In this respect, we have
134. Id. at 14.
135. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010).
136. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 4.
137. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32
DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 84, 99–100 (2007); Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of
Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 464 (2008).
138. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 18 tbl.B.
139. SPENCER STUART, supra note 132, at 12.
140. See id. at 13.
141. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 4, 17 tbl.A.
142. See id. at 6.
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come to expect that a smaller group of directors can carry out
increasingly greater responsibilities.
Third, often director responsibilities disproportionately fall
on a particular board committee, rather than the board as a
whole.143 In the last set of reforms, the committee experiencing
the greatest level of enhanced responsibilities was the audit
committee.144 Reflecting these increased responsibilities, audit
committees saw the greatest rise in the frequency of their meetings as well as the greatest rise in the time devoted to board
matters.145 Current reforms focus significantly on the compensation committee,146 which has on average three members.147 A
2009 study revealed that compensation committees were already meeting more frequently, likely due to the increased focus on compensation matters.148 These new reforms demand an
even greater time commitment from such committee members.
This means that the enhanced work required of directors is actually being imposed on a small subset of the board, a subset
already burdened with additional meetings and workloads.
Finally, it is possible that reforms augmenting shareholder
rights exacerbate this overburdening problem. If proxy access
and other election related reforms increase the potential for
election contests, they could prove distracting in ways that undermine boards’ ability to fully carry out their other responsibilities.149 Indeed, election contests are time-consuming and,
thus, any spike in those contests could ensure that directors
turn their attention away from other issues. Of course it is
possible that legal challenges will hinder implementation of
proxy access and, thus, the distractions associated with proxy
access may never materialize.150 However, even without such
access, rules aimed at increasing shareholder power inevitably
increase board responsibilities with respect to shareholders,
ensuring that they devote time and resources toward under-

143. Cf. id. at 18 tbl.B (“[R]esponsibilities of boards specifically identified
in the proxies and assigned to a particular committee.”).
144. See Lawrence Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (2008).
145. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 18–19 tbls.C–E.
146. See supra Part I.A.4.
147. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 19 tbl.D.
148. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 132, at 7, 9.
149. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,765 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
150. See Holzer, supra note 112, at C3.
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standing issues of concern to the shareholder base.151 Thus, reforms like changes to broker discretionary voting and the increased implementation of majority voting heighten the corporation’s need to identify and interact with investors.152 Indeed,
in adopting its final proxy access rule, the SEC identified concerns that “the board may incur costs in attempting to institute
policies and procedures it believes will address shareholder
concerns.”153
To be sure, the observation that enhanced shareholder
rights may involve an increased time commitment from directors does not necessarily mean that such an enhancement is
not legitimate or otherwise worthwhile. As the SEC noted, the
costs associated with new shareholder rights may be offset by
the new rules themselves as well as the benefits associated
with those rules.154
Nonetheless, the combination of the time commitment associated with increased shareholder rights coupled with the
time necessary to tackle directors’ new responsibilities in other
areas does raise serious questions about board capacity. Importantly, are we asking too much of the relatively small pool of
part-time directors tasked with these new responsibilities? New
reforms do not answer that question, thereby failing to fully
reconcile the duties imposed on boards with the realities of
board life.
B. INDEPENDENCE VS. EXPERTISE?
Reforms also impose responsibilities on the board without
a careful consideration of how, and to what extent, directors
will have the expertise to carry out those duties. Only one
reform references director expertise.155 The new SEC disclosure
rules now require companies to disclose the “experience, qualifications, attributes or skills” of all board nominees and directors every year.156 However, other rules are not only silent on
this issue,157 but may potentially undermine director expertise.
151. See supra Part I.A.4.
152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the notion that
shareholders’ enhanced rights require enhanced interaction between the board
and its shareholders).
153. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,765.
154. See id.
155. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,342 (Dec.
23, 2009).
156. Id.
157. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
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In particular, reforms that focus on director independence
could prove counterproductive. Indeed, all public company
compensation committees must now consist entirely of independent directors.158 On the one hand, this new mandate may
appear unremarkable. Indeed, this mandate parallels the one
encompassed in SOX for audit committees.159 Moreover, this
mandate appears to codify existing listing standards which require compensation, audit, and nominating committees to consist of independent directors.160 In the vast majority of public
companies, not only are most board committees comprised solely of independent directors, but almost all board members are
independent.161 In 2007 the average board only had two directors who were not independent.162 As a result, reforms in this
area do not appear to break any new ground.
On the other hand, such reforms further legitimize the
presumption in favor of board independence without a full appreciation of the potential drawbacks associated with that independence.163 Evidence on the benefits of independence both
with respect to the entire board and with respect to certain
committees is equivocal. Some empirical studies support the
notion that independent directors improve corporate perfor-

Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010).
158. Id.
159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
775–77.
160. See NASDAQ, INC., NASDAQ LISTING RULES, rs. 5605(c) (audit committee), 5605(d) (compensation committee), 5605(e) (nominating committees)
(2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/pdf/new_listing_
rules.pdf; NYSE, INC., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.07 (audit committee), 303A.05 (compensation committee), 303A.04 (nominating committee)
(2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?
selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F;
see also NYSE AMEX, INC., NYSE AMEX L.L.C. COMPANY GUIDE §§ 803 (audit
committee), 804 (nominating committee), 805 (compensation committee) (2008),
available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEXtools/PlatformViewer.asp?Selected
Node=chp_1_1_8&manual=/AMEX/CompanyGuide/amex-company-guide/.
161. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between
Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231,
239 (2002) [hereinafter Bhagat & Black, Long-Term Performance]; Jeffrey
Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1476
(2007); KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 6, 19 tbl.D.
162. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 6.
163. See Cunningham, supra note 144, at 494 –97 (2008) (discussing the
“curious” pattern of rewarding independence over expertise).
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mance.164 Moreover, some studies find that boards comprised of
independent directors perform better at particular tasks such
as firing a poorly performing CEO165 and detecting fraud.166
Other studies reveal that greater independence on the audit
committee improves financial reporting,167 while reducing the
incidence of abusive accounting practices.168
By contrast, some studies find no significant correlation between enhanced director independence and corporate performance.169 In addition, a study of nominating, audit, and compensation committees found little evidence that complete
independence on those committees positively impacted a company’s performance.170 Studies also indicate that independent
directors may not be more effective at discrete tasks such as
monitoring companies in financial distress.171 More importantly
for purposes of the current reforms, studies indicate that independent directors may not have an impact on curtailing CEO
compensation.172 Then too, no study supports the proposition
that a supermajority of independent directors will produce better corporate performance.173
While scholars disagree with respect to the weight that
should be given to various studies, even proponents of enhanced director independence acknowledge that the empirical
evidence on the benefits associated with independent directors
164. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843,
1866 (2007); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Sarbanes-Oxley, Governance and
Performance 17 (Mar. 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1361815.
165. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 431, 444, 452–54 (1988).
166. See Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate Fraud, 60
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 39 (2004).
167. Prentice & Spence, supra note 164, at 1872–73.
168. See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 164, at 19 (finding financial expert directors are not busier and thus not associated with weaker corporate governance).
169. E.g., Bhagat & Black, Long-Term Performance, supra note 161, at
231, 263.
170. See April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41
J.L. & ECON. 275, 300–01 (1998).
171. E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 932–33
(1999) [hereinafter Bhagat & Black, Uncertain Relationship].
172. See Bhagat & Black, Long-Term Performance, supra note 161, at 235.
173. See id.; Bhagat & Black, Uncertain Relationship, supra note 171, at
922–23.
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is mixed, if not “weak at best.”174 Moreover, studies indicate
that factors beyond director independence may explain the positive relationship between such independence and improved
corporate performance.175
Even if independent directors produce some benefits for the
corporation, such benefits must be weighed against costs that
may undermine reform goals. Indeed, independent directors by
their very nature are not employed by the company and, hence,
have no first-hand knowledge of the day-to-day affairs of the
corporation.176 Moreover, currently there is no requirement
that directors have any industry-specific knowledge about the
company on whose boards they serve.177 Thus, while many directors may have knowledge about business matters more generally, there is nothing to ensure that they have knowledge regarding the particular industry or the specific company on
whose board they sit.178 This suggests that even as we impose
additional responsibilities on directors, those directors may not
have the expertise necessary to effectively grapple with those
responsibilities.
In addition, it is possible that shareholder reforms exacerbate this expertise problem in at least three respects. First, by
enabling shareholders to determine who is nominated to the
board, proxy access creates the possibility that shareholders
will elect directors without the skill-set to tackle important
problems, or that the overall board will not have the appropri174. Gordon, supra note 161, at 1500; see also Prentice & Spence, supra
note 164, at 1864, 1867 (“[The evidence is] decidedly mixed, [and thus] one
cannot claim the empirical evidence clearly indicates that more independent
boards will produce better financial results.”).
175. Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 164, at 4.
176. See Clarke, supra note 137, at 79; Rodrigues, supra note 137, at
460 n.66.
177. Statutes give boards the discretion to determine director qualifications. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 2010) (same); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.02 (2009) (enabling director qualifications to be set forth in the
bylaws or charter). While SOX requires that at least one member of the audit
committee be a “financial expert,” see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 407(a), 116 Stat. 745, 790, the new rules do not dictate any further
director qualifications. See also Laurie B. Smilan, The New Enhanced Disclosure Rules—Ready, Set, Change and Now, in AUDIT COMMITTEE WORKSHOP
2010, at 611, 630 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No
23,982, 2010), available at WL 1820 PLI/Corp 611.
178. See Margaret A. Bancroft, Knowledge is Power: What Went Wrong in
the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 145, 154–55 (2006) (noting that
independent directors do not even have experience relevant to the industry, let
alone specific experience related to the company on whose board they serve).
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ate mix of skills necessary to perform its responsibility.179
Second, by potentially increasing the number of contested elections or otherwise increasing directors’ election vulnerability,
enhanced shareholder rights may discourage qualified candidates from serving on boards, thereby reducing the overall pool
of qualified candidates available for board service.180 Third,
campaigns aimed at increasing majority voting and decreasing
classified boards increase the possibility that directors will
serve for shorter terms,181 making it more difficult to create a
group of board members with a long-term knowledge of the
company and the industry.
To be sure, these possibilities are not an inevitable byproduct of increased shareholder power. Instead, it is possible
that the new rules may have relatively little impact on directors’ willingness to serve. Moreover, such rules may enhance
the overall quality of boards by increasing the diversity of
board candidates.182
Nonetheless, like the overburdening problem, the possibility that boards will not have the expertise to carry out their
functions could undermine their ability to sufficiently fulfill
those functions. Indeed, new reforms not only require directors
to fulfill an increased amount of responsibilities, but also require them to attend to different types of issues ranging from
shareholder-related concerns to those involving risk assessments. Such requirements certainly raise the possibility that
directors may not be equipped to sufficiently address the complete range of issues on which they are now being asked to focus.
C. IMPLICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH OUTSIDE ADVISORS
Reforms also increase the possibility that boards will unduly rely on management, advisors, and outside consultants in a
manner that could have significant negative repercussions.
This possibility could emerge in a variety of ways. First, the
mere fact that boards may feel overburdened could prompt
them to rely more heavily on outsiders and management in or179. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,765–66 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249)
(detailing concerns).
180. Id. at 56,765.
181. See Fairfax, supra note 84, at 61–71 (discussing trends related to majority voting and classified boards).
182. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,766.
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der to alleviate that burden. Second, anecdotal and other evidence suggest that when directors believe that they lack the
necessary expertise to grapple with particular issues, they tend
to rely more heavily on managers and other advisors perceived
to have such expertise.183 From this perspective, it is no surprise that the growing influence of compensation consultants184
coincides with the increased emphasis on independent directors
who often may feel ill equipped to tackle the complexities of
compensation matters. Finally, increasing shareholders’ power
also may increase the potential for enhanced reliance on outside consultants such as proxy and advisory firms. Shareholders tend to rely on such firms for voting and other advice because the firms are perceived to have more resources and to be
better informed about issues on which shareholders must cast
their vote.185 Shareholders’ reliance on these firms impacts
boards because boards look to such firms for cues regarding
shareholder preferences.186 In this manner, increased shareholder voice increases the likelihood that these firms will play a
more central role in board decisionmaking.187
To be sure, reliance on managers and outside advisors may
be beneficial. Indeed, one should expect that directors would rely on outsiders to help educate them on particular issues, or to
fill the gap in their own knowledge base.188 Importantly, reforms expect and even encourage such reliance.189
183. See Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation
Through a Partnership Lens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
153, 175–76 (2000); Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay
Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1191–92
(2004) (noting that compensation committees hire expert compensation consultants to assist with its tasks).
184. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 768 (2002); Fogel & Geier, supra note 7, at 62 n.125; Mary-Hunter Morris, The Price of Advice, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 153, 176–77 (2009); Randall S. Thomas,
Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 466–67 (2003).
185. See Stephen Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 655 (2009) (noting the tendency of shareholders to
rely on proxy services who are perceived to have more specialized expertise
with respect to voting issues); Gordon, supra note 21, at 351–52.
186. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 653.
187. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 352 (“The propensity of many U.S. institutional investors to delegate such decisions could well give power to a handful
of proxy service firms to make substantively very important decisions with potentially economy-wide ramifications.”).
188. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 655.
189. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010) (providing for di-
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However, significant reliance on management and advisors
raises its own set of problems. First, there always exists the potential that directors may inappropriately defer to such decisions.190 Such deference could mean that directors fail to sufficiently criticize or probe decisions made by third parties.191 In
this way, directors’ reliance could lead to the kind of rubber
stamping of critical decisions that reforms are aimed at preventing.
Second, directors’ increased reliance on advisors could negatively impact the performance of board duties because such
advisors may have conflicts of interests that undermine reform
goals. Indeed, studies reveal that advisors can have conflicts of
interest resulting from their dual role of both establishing
guidelines in a given area while also providing advice with respect to particular decisions in that same area.192 Reflecting
such conflicts, a 2007 report commissioned by the House of
Representatives revealed a pervasive level of conflicts of interests among compensation consultants.193 Such conflicts raise
transparency issues. Indeed, according to the report, not only
did companies fail to disclose the extent of such conflicts, but
often companies identified consultants as independent even
when other information suggested the existence of conflicts.194
Furthermore, the report indicated that conflicted consultants
worsen problems associated with excessive or inappropriate executive compensation.195 Thus, companies with highly conflicted consultants paid their CEOs a median salary sixty-seven
percent higher than the median salary of companies that had

rector engagement of compensation consultants, independent legal counsel,
and other advisors).
190. See Fogel & Grier, supra note 7, at 62; Morris, supra note 184, at 176–
77; Stabile, supra note 183, at 175–76; Thomas, supra note 184, at 467.
191. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 650.
192. See id. at 657–58; Gordon, supra note 21, at 352–53.
193. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH
CONG., EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION
CONSULTANTS, at i, 4 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://www.erieri.com/
PDF/Executive-Consultant-Conflicts.pdf (noting that over one hundred Fortune 250 firms hired compensation consultants that have been hired by corporate management to provide other services to the company, and that often the
amount the consultants earned for these other services far outstripped the
amount earned for compensation advice).
194. See id. at 5.
195. See id. at 6.
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hired consultants without such conflicts.196 Then too, the median CEO salary increased at a higher pace in companies with
conflicted compensation consultants.197 To be sure, reforms aim
to reduce conflicts related to compensation consultants by enhancing the independence criteria associated with such consultants.198 However, it is not clear if such criteria will have their
desired effect. In addition, no such criteria exist for proxy firms
and similar advisors, despite concerns about their potential
conflicts of interest.199 Thus, it remains possible that consultants can pose conflicts that prevent reforms from achieving
their goal. As a result, undue reliance on such consultants is
especially troubling.
Third, reliance on such advisors may increase the potential
for one-size-fits-all solutions that could negatively impact corporations and undermine the effectiveness of reforms. Several
commentators have expressed concern that overreliance on
compensation consultants could lead corporations to “homogenize” compensation practices.200 Studies associated with the
United Kingdom reveal that such homogenization has occurred.201 While there may be some practices that are applicable across companies, it is likely that standardizing certain
practices would lead to suboptimal compensation practices at
some companies.202 Such a possibility suggests that an undue
reliance on outside advisors could have unintended and negative consequences for reform goals.
Finally, a heightened reliance on outside advisors may
raise accountability concerns. Indeed, in the context of proxy
advisors, several commentators have expressed fear that such
advisors have an inordinate amount of power without sufficient
accountability for how they wield that power.203 While this fear

196. See id. The median salary of CEOs with highly conflicted consultants
was $12.5 million as opposed to $7.5 million for CEOs with nonconflicted consultants. Id.
197. See id. at 7 (demonstrating that the median CEO salary increase of
the most highly conflicted consultants rose by 226 percent over a five-year period, as compared to 105 percent amongst nonconflicted CEOs).
198. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010).
199. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 657–58.
200. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 347–48; Lund, supra note 22, at 130–31.
201. See Davis, supra note 28, at 51.
202. See Lund, supra note 22, at 130–32.
203. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 657–58 (pinpointing concerns).
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may be exaggerated,204 it nevertheless underscores the fact
that outside advisors are not accountable to shareholders or
other corporate constituents. In this respect, reliance on those
advisors creates the potential for an environment of reduced
accountability at odds with reform goals.
D. CONCLUDING ASSESSMENTS
This Part demonstrates that reforms may have overestimated directors’ ability to grapple with the variety of new responsibilities imposed upon them. Indeed, the board is composed of a small group of people with significant outside
obligations. Reforms enhance those obligations without assessing whether directors have the ability to effectively perform
them. Moreover, reforms require directors to tackle increasingly complex issues without any discussion regarding whether
they have the necessary expertise. As a result, reforms may encourage directors to unduly rely on management and outside
advisors. This Part reveals that reforms raise legitimate concerns regarding whether we can expect directors to carry out
their new roles with the kind of diligence and rigor needed to
avoid the next calamity, or if we have simply set boards up for
failure in this regard.
III. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY MISMATCH
This Part focuses on the fiduciary duty concerns raised by
increasing directors’ responsibilities with respect to compensation and risk. As this Part will demonstrate, directors’ liability
risk appears to be at odds with reform goals, particularly to the
extent those goals seek to enhance director accountability or
otherwise incentivize directors to more effectively fulfill their
monitoring role.
A. DIRECTOR DUTIES AND THE RARITY OF LIABILITY
Under Delaware law, the risk that directors will be held
personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duty in connection with compensation-related decisions is exceedingly low.205
Importantly, the leading and most comprehensive empirical
study on outside director liability makes clear that, as a general matter, directors’ risk of personal liability with respect to
204. See id. at 696.
205. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1055, 1062 (2006).
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paying legal expenses or damages either in connection with
judgments following a shareholder suit or a settlement agreement is relatively low, making such liability a “rare occurrence.”206
This observation is especially apropos with respect to compensation matters. Indeed, in light of directors’ express authority to determine the compensation of officers and agents,207
courts grant them wide discretion in this area.208 That discretion protects director decisions even if they can be characterized as ill-advised or poorly timed.209 Thus, a board or compensation committee decision will be protected even if it falls “far
short of corporate governance ‘best practices.’”210 In fact, unless
such decisions can be defined as fraudulent or unconscionable,
directors will not be held liable for them.211 Boards’ discretion
in this area extends to their ability to rely on others who may
have expertise in compensation matters.212 Reasonable reliance
on compensation consultants or other experts often insulates
boards from seemingly ill-advised compensation decisions.213 In
light of these realities, it is extremely difficult to hold directors
liable for compensation decisions.
A similar pattern emerges with respect to allegations involving breach of directors’ duty to oversee risk. As an initial
matter, Delaware courts have made clear that seeking to hold
206. See id.
207. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (2001).
208. See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553 (Del. 2001); Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214 –15 (Del.
1996); Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ.A. 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 28, 2003).
209. See, e.g., White, 783 A.2d at 553 (holding that strike-suit settlements
were within the confines of the business judgment rule, without examining the
merits of the allegations); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262 (declaring that the burden
was on plaintiff to rebut the presumption of validity of board action under the
business judgment rule, where the board has followed expert advice); Grimes,
673 A.2d at 1215 (declaring that the business judgment rule extends to the
awarding of large severance packages to senior management); Litt, 2003 WL
1794724, at *6 n.39 (deeming the distribution of bonuses well within the discretion of the board).
210. See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55 (Del. 2006).
211. See White, 783 A.2d at 553; Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262; Grimes, 673 A.2d
at 1215; Litt, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 n.39.
212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (Supp. 2010) (“A member of the
board of directors . . . shall . . . be fully protected in relying in good faith upon .
. . opinions . . . the member reasonably believes are within such other person’s
professional or expert competence . . . .”).
213. See Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 60.
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directors liable for breaching their oversight duty represents
“possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”214 This difficulty appears to be exacerbated when oversight claims involve
allegations of improper risk assessments.215 Courts begin from
the premise that directors have significant discretion to evaluate and determine their company’s risk appetite. As one Delaware court noted, “[T]he essence of the business judgment of
managers and directors is deciding how the company will evaluate the trade-off between risk and return.”216 That court then
insisted that fiduciary duty law was “designed to allow corporate managers and directors to pursue risky transactions without the specter of being held personally liable if those decisions
turn out poorly.”217
Based on this understanding of directors’ personal liability
exposure in this area, the court expressed considerable doubt
about the appropriateness of oversight cases alleging directors’
failure to properly manage risk, noting that it is “almost impossible” for a court to determine whether directors had properly evaluated risk.218 Thus, even if such a case could be brought,
there would be an extremely high burden on plaintiffs “seeking
to state a claim for personal director liability for a failure to see
the extent of a company’s business risk.”219 Moreover, if a corporation has an audit or risk management committee in place
designed to report information with respect to risk, the existence of such a committee goes a long way toward shielding directors from liability.220 As a result, Delaware courts have indicated that cases in this area would be almost impossible to
win.221 As this suggests, under current law, directors’ liability
exposure for breaches of their oversight responsibilities associated with risk appears to be almost nonexistent.
Directors’ relatively low risk of liability related to compensation and risk seems at odds with federal reforms. In particu214. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 371 (Del.
2006) (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967
(Del. Ch. 1996)).
215. See In re Citigroup S’holder Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 106 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(noting the high burden for claims related to oversight).
216. Id. at 126.
217. Id. at 125.
218. Id. at 126.
219. Id. at 125.
220. Id. at 127.
221. See id.
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lar, it seems in tension with the apparent desire to hold directors more accountable for their actions in these areas. Indeed,
many reforms appear to reflect a desire to increase the accountability of directors, especially for compensation and risk decisions.222 In adopting proxy access rules, the SEC specifically
noted that the financial crisis had generated serious concerns
about the accountability of some companies and boards, “and
whether boards need to be more accountable for their decisions
regarding issues such as compensation structures and risk
management.”223 Yet this section’s analysis of state fiduciary
law makes clear that such law imposes no significant risk of
personal liability for director duties related to such issues. As a
result, one can be concerned about whether Delaware fiduciary
law appropriately incentivizes directors to effectively perform
their responsibilities related to risk monitoring or related to establishing appropriate compensation policies and practices.224
In this regard, the lack of personal accountability inherent in
Delaware fiduciary law seems to run counter to the expressed
intent of reforms, reflecting an apparent disconnection between
reform goals and that law.
B. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM
Of course, this appearance may be deceiving for at least
three reasons. First, reforms may embody their own accountability mechanism, making reliance on state fiduciary law un222. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249);
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009)
(emphasizing the focus on corporate accountability in adopting rules related to
compensation and risk oversight); Richard Hall & John White, A New Emphasis on Director Accountability, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (June 2010), http://
www.whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/28396/a-new-emphasis-director
-accountability/ (discussing the focus on accountability throughout reforms);
Sheppard Mullin, New TARP Executive Compensation Guidance and a Call for
Further Reform in Compensation Practices, CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (June
18, 2009), http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/tax-new-tarp-executive
-compensation-guidance-and-a-call-for-further-reform-in-executive-compensation
-practices.html (noting that the Treasury Department aimed to promote accountability through say-on-pay legislation and enhancements related to compensation committees).
223. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,669.
224. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 717, 718 (2010) (arguing that by failing to hold boards of directors responsible for “harmful outcomes that do not involve wrongful or illegal acts
. . . Delaware courts have encouraged boards to be uninformed of aggressive
risk-taking by officers”).
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necessary. Second, reforms may look beyond personal liability
as a means for ensuring effective director accountability. Third,
reforms may be relying on fiduciary duty law to adapt to the altered environment. This section will evaluate these possibilities
and demonstrate the manner in which each appears unconvincing.
1. Shareholder Power as Accountability
It is possible that reforms themselves serve to enhance directors’ accountability. In particular, it is clear that reforms
aimed at increasing shareholder power also aim to enhance director accountability.225 This is especially true with respect to
proxy access.226 Say-on-pay is also aimed at making directors
more accountable for their compensation decisions.227 Similarly, changes in broker voting rules have the goal of increasing
director accountability.228 In this regard, it is possible that reforms sought to rely on increasing shareholder power as a
means for ensuring director accountability.
However, this possibility is problematic for several reasons.
One, proxy access may never materialize, thereby undermining
any expected increase in shareholders’ ability to hold directors
accountable stemming from such access.229 Two, while there
are other reforms aimed at increasing shareholder power, several commentators have argued that those reforms may be
flawed and hence may not meaningfully enhance shareholder
rights.230 Indeed, some mechanisms continue to leave directors
with significant discretion over voting matters, prompting the
conclusion that any apparent grant of shareholder power is il-

225. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 2–3.
226. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,669–70 (noting that proxy access was critical to holding boards accountable).
227. E.g., Elisse B. Walter, SEC Comm’r, Restoring Investor Trust
Through Corporate Governance, Remarks Before the Practising Law Institute
(Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch021809
ebw.htm (noting that say-on-pay promotes increased accountability of board
members and corporate management).
228. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule
452, Exchange Act Release No. 34 -60215, 12 n.34, 14 (July 1, 2009), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34 -60215.pdf (noting that brokervoting rule changes were important for ensuring director accountability in the
election process).
229. See Fairfax, supra note 101, at 1268–69.
230. See, e.g., id. at 1261; William K. Sjostrom & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 461–63 (2007).
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lusory.231 This means that any increase in director accountability associated with those mechanisms may also be illusory.
Even the SEC has recognized that these other mechanisms fall
short of enhancing shareholders rights and thus fall short of effectively bolstering director accountability.232 Three, relying
solely on increased shareholder power to increase board accountability seems ill-advised for several reasons, including the
tendency of shareholders to be apathetic as well as the potential that shareholders will advance concerns at odds with the
best interests of the corporation.233 These reasons may blunt
the ability of shareholders to exercise their power adequately or
effectively. In this regard, an exclusive reliance on increased
shareholder power as a means for holding directors accountable
seems troubling.
2. Extralegal Sanctions and Accountability
It is also possible that reforms seek to depend upon mechanisms beyond personal liability to ensure accountability.
Many argue that personal liability is not the only, nor the most
effective, means of holding directors accountable for their actions.234 Instead, they argue that extralegal devices such as the
market and directors’ concern for their reputations do a better
job of ensuring that directors pay heed to their duties.235 The
existence of these devices suggests that reforms may not pose
an accountability conundrum.
However, such a suggestion is unconvincing given that reforms reflected clear dissatisfaction with the status quo as it
231. See Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 230, at 463 (referring to majority voting as “smoke and mirrors”).
232. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,670–72 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
233. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 86, at 577; Bratton & Wacthter, supra
note 86, at 653.
234. See Black et al., supra note 205, at 1140 (noting the importance of
market incentives and reputation in supplementing the limited deterrence of
out-of-pocket liability for directors); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1265–68 (1999) (noting that directors
adhere to their duties based on reputational threats); David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
653, 673 (1984) (noting the importance of extra-legal sanctions in regulating
director conduct, and the undesirability of legal regulations); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 47–48 (2002) (defending a preference for market-based solutions).
235. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 234, at 1265–68.
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pertained to accountability.236 To the extent these other measures reflected that status quo, it seems curious that reforms
would rely solely on them for accountability purposes. Moreover, even proponents of extralegal accountability measures acknowledge that they may be insufficient on their own to promote director accountability.237 Instead, they must supplement
some level of personal liability risk.238 Most importantly, while
there may be disagreement about the optimal level of personal
liability risk necessary to effectively promote director accountability, it seems relatively clear that reforms viewed the current level as suboptimal.239 Reform’s failure to alter that level,
therefore, appears to be in tension with reform goals.
3. State Law Deference?
It is also possible that reforms seek to rely on states to
craft appropriate accountability mechanism that account for directors’ increased responsibilities. Most would agree that Delaware’s judiciary has developed an expertise in corporate affairs that makes Delaware judges uniquely adept at responding
to governance issues quickly and effectively.240 Moreover, some
insist that the tasks of crafting appropriate responses to the
crisis—including crafting appropriate accountability mechanism—should be left to Delaware and other states, as opposed to
the federal government.241 From this perspective, it is arguable
that reforms appropriately left the fiduciary duty question open

236. Accord G20 Statement on Strengthening the Financial System,
REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=
USL566412820090905 (envisioning governance reforms that increase oversight and accountability).
237. See Black et al., supra note 205, at 1140 (noting that market, reputation, and other soft incentives supplement personal liability).
238. Id.
239. See id. at 1062.
240. E.g., Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of Corporate Law, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1836 (2008) (describing the structural
attributes of the Delaware judiciary that allow it to be viewed as impartial by
the business community); Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771 passim (2009); Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN L. REV. 679,
725–26 (2002) (explaining how the reputation of the Delaware judiciary’s corporate law expertise attracts corporations).
241. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,670–72 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249)
(summarizing the comments submitted by those insisting that a federal rule is
not necessary).
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so that states could grapple with the task of altering fiduciary
duty norms to take account of the new regulatory environment.
However, the probability that Delaware courts will alter or
otherwise expand their conception of fiduciary duty as applied
to risk and compensation seems extremely low. Delaware’s
most recent pronouncement regarding directors’ risk of oversight liability occurred in the context of a case arising out of the
financial crisis.242 Similarly, its analysis of director liability in
the context of compensation arrangements occurred in the context of a heightened concern about excessive executive compensation.243 In both cases, the court appeared to resoundingly endorse the status quo with respect to directors’ duties and
liability risk in these areas despite a seemingly altered environment related to these issues.244 Hence, the likelihood that
Delaware will reconsider its longstanding fiduciary duty principles seems remote.
C. IMPLICATIONS
What does this relatively low risk of personal liability
mean? On the one hand, many have articulated why it makes
sense for fiduciary duty law to ensure that shareholders must
meet a relatively high threshold in order to hold directors liable
for breaching their fiduciary duty.245 Indeed, imposing such liability involves a hindsight judgment that could be inappropriate and could undermine directors’ ability to make the kinds
of risky decisions we might actually favor.246 Moreover, there
are thorny issues involved with setting appropriate pay as well
as divergent views about the appropriateness of particular pay
structures. Thus, significantly enhancing directors’ risk of personal liability with respect to these decisions also involves
hindsight judgments that may be inappropriate and counterproductive.247
242. In re Citigroup S’holder Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 112–13 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(detailing Citigroup’s exposure to the subprime crisis).
243. In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 33 (Del. 2006).
244. See id. (approving a $130 million severance package for president fired
without cause); Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123 (upholding bad faith as the standard for oversight liability).
245. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 108 (2004) (identifying why the authority
to make corporate decisions should lie somewhere, whether it be with the
boards or with the courts).
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business
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On the other hand, the pendulum may have swung too far
with respect to liability risk, resulting in a fiduciary duty regime that does not incentivize directors to make efficient decisions or otherwise hold them accountable for their failure to do
so.248 Indeed, to the extent some threat of personal liability is
necessary to supplement other forms of accountability mechanisms, it could be that the current threat level is simply too low.
Ultimately, however, the lack of personal liability associated with current fiduciary duty law diverges from reform expectations about accountability. Indeed, such reforms expressed frustration with the current accountability regime and,
thus, clearly embody a desire to enhance directors’ accountability beyond its current state. Fiduciary duty law fails to satisfy
this desire, and it seems unlikely that the law will significantly
change in the future. This suggests a need to reconcile the apparent expectation of reforms with the limits embedded in laws
necessary to support those reforms.
Reforms do not seem to acknowledge or otherwise recognize this limit. This lack of recognition raises questions about
the ability of the reforms to achieve their goals, while challenging us to think critically about directors and effective measures
for ensuring that they pay heed to their new duties. Indeed, we
likely need to engage in a closer examination of fiduciary duty
rules, including procedural roadblocks associated with bringing
challenges under those rules. In addition, it could be that we
need to expand the number of directors who serve on boards so
that we can have more confidence about the board’s capacity to
tackle their increased responsibilities and, hence, less concern
that they will not have sufficient time for their new duties. In
fact, it could be time to more seriously consider the notion of a
professional director. Unfortunately, reforms did not grapple
with any of these considerations. Instead, reforms continued
the troubling shift, which began with SOX, of expanding the
board’s role without meaningfully expanding the support and
even incentives the board may need to carry out that role effectively.

Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty,
66 MD. L. REV. 398, 443 (2007) (exploring the reality of “hindsight bias” that
courts are stricken with when attempting to analyze business decisions).
248. See Pan, supra note 224, at 718.
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CONCLUSION
The financial crisis ushered in a wave of governmental reforms that intruded on board functions and responsibilities. As
a result of those reforms, it is relatively clear that board duties
have been dramatically enhanced. Hence, current and future
boards will be charged with performing many more tasks because of the financial crisis and reform effort.
However, because existing reforms failed to fully acknowledge or grapple with the limitations associated with board
functions and fiduciary duty, the board’s ability to effectively
fulfill those tasks may be hampered. Moreover, there may exist
no effective mechanism for ensuring that boards are held accountable for failing to perform their new tasks.
Ultimately, what is necessary is a more robust discussion
of boards and their role in the modern corporation. To be sure,
the federal government may not be in the position to fully engage that discussion. However, at the very least, reforms may
reflect the need for others to begin that engagement.

